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ABSTRACT
Software-as-a-service (SaaS) has been a growing trend in
cloud computing for several years. Moreover, SaaS providers
are evolving to application-level multi-tenancy, in which all
tenants share the application instances, platform and data
store with the aim of maximizing resource sharing. For
multi-tenant SaaS applications, access control often is the
only application-level security mechanism. However, such
access control is inherently complex because both the pro-
vider and all tenants should be able to specify their access
rules for the application. Moreover, these rules must all
be securely combined and correctly enforced in the shared
multi-tenant application. To address this challenge, we
present the Amusa access control middleware. Amusa en-
ables both the provider and all its tenants to efficiently de-
clare their access rules on the SaaS application. To achieve
this, Amusa provides incremental three-layered management
based on attribute-based tree-structured policies. After-
wards, Amusa securely combines the access rules of all par-
ties and enforces them at run-time with low performance
overhead.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, Software as a Service (SaaS) has
drawn increased interest from both industry as well as re-
search communities. SaaS is a type of cloud computing in
which tenant organizations rent access to a shared, typi-
cally web-based application hosted by a provider [19]. Each
of these tenants represents multiple end-users, such as their
employees. For the tenants, SaaS promises low management
costs. For the provider, SaaS promises lower operational
costs by employing application-level multi-tenancy.
Application-level multi-tenancy is an architectural strat-
egy in which all tenants share the same code base, appli-
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
SAC’15 April 13-17, 2015, Salamanca, Spain.
Copyright 2015 ACM 978-1-4503-3196-8/15/04...$15.00.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2695664.2695708
Figure 1: The Amusa middleware facilitates incremental
three-layered management of multi-tenant SaaS applica-
tions.
cation instances and data store [13]. As opposed to the
traditional approach of developing and deploying separate
versions of the application for each tenant, multi-tenancy
aims to reduce the operational costs of cloud applications
by maximizing resource sharing.
Access control is the most important and often only appli-
cation-level security mechanism for SaaS applications. Appli-
cation-level access control is responsible for constraining the
actions of authenticated subjects on the resources in the ap-
plication by enforcing access rules, for example stating that
only sales managers of the European region can send sales
offers and only to their assigned customers.
However, access control for multi-tenant SaaS applications
is inherently complex: an access control system for multi-
tenant SaaS applications should make sure that tenants can-
not access each other’s resources in the application, should
enable the provider to constrain its tenants based on its own
rules, should enable the tenants to constrain their end-users
based on their own rules, and should enforce the appropriate
rules in the shared application at run-time.
Providing this functionality is even more a challenge be-
cause the access rules vary from case to case. For exam-
ple, some applications require tenants to be fully isolated
while others require business partners to access each others
resources. Similarly, some providers want to constrain ten-
ants based on a pre-paid model, others based on a post-paid
model. Additionally, some tenants want to constrain their
employees based on their region, others based on contracts,
skills or departments. Moreover, if all parties can express
their access rules, these rules should be combined securely.
For example, tenants should not be able to specify rules that
override the provider’s policies or give the tenant access to
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the resources of other tenants.
As a result of this complexity, the state of practice in
SaaS application development does not achieve these re-
quirements. Firstly, the provider’s policies about tenants are
often hard-coded in the application. Secondly, the tenant-
specific access control rules are often supported using a sim-
ple role-based scheme. And thirdly, tenant isolation is ei-
ther hard-coded in the application or relies on isolation at
the level of the data-store such as using namespaced silos in
Google App Engine [2]. As a result, the provider policies are
hard to customize, tenants are able to express only a limited
set of access rules, and tenant separation is inflexible.
The state of the art in access control also does not meet
these challenges. The combination of policy-based access
control [21] with attribute-based [14], tree-structured [7, 17]
policies supports the declarative specification of a wide range
of rules outside of the application and binding these at run-
time. However, these bare technologies still require each
SaaS provider to build a multi-tenant access control layer on
top of them. And even when employing these technologies,
addressing the requirements stated above is not an easy task.
To address these issues, we present Amusa (Access control
middleware for Multi-tenant SaaS Applications, illustrated
in Figure 1). Amusa allows both the provider and all its
tenants to express their access rules for the SaaS applica-
tion using expressive attribute-based policies. Amusa com-
bines these policies securely and enforces them at run-time.
Moreover, Amusa simplifies the overall access control man-
agement using an incremental three-layered approach and
introduces low performance overhead. Amusa is motivated
by two distinct industrial case studies and builds on a large
body of work in access control and policy-based middleware.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 further elaborates on the case studies and summarizes
the requirements of Amusa. Section 3 describes Amusa in
terms of its employed technologies, its three-layered man-
agement architecture and its supporting middleware archic-
tecture. Section 4 evaluates Amusa in terms of security and
performance. Section 5 gives an overview of related work.
Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. MOTIVATION
In this section we motivate and illustrate the challenge of
access control for Software-as-a-Service applications based
on two case studies of industrial SaaS providers. We first
describe these case studies, then illustrate the challenges for
access control and conclude with the resulting requirements.
2.1 Industrial case studies
This work was performed in collaboration with two indus-
trial SaaS providers in the domains of automated document
processing and workforce management, respectively called
eDocs and eWorkforce in this paper.
eDocs. eDocs offers a service to its tenants to efficiently
generate and distribute large numbers of digital personalized
documents to their respective users and customers. Typi-
cal examples of these tenants are large companies such as
banks and press agencies, which distribute pay checks and
invoices. Tenants can group and search their submitted doc-
uments and can track the receipt of these documents. On
the receiving side, users can employ the eDocs platform to
read and manage all their received documents.
eWorkforce. eWorkforce offers a service to automati-
cally plan the workflows for the product and service appoint-
ments of its tenants. Typical examples of these appoint-
ments are install and repair jobs for tenants such as large
telecom operators, utility companies and retailers. eWork-
force assigns the resulting appointments to the appropriate
technicians of its subcontractors, which are the companies
executing the actual task. The technicians receive these ap-
pointments using the mobile eWorkforce application and af-
terwards report task progress and consumed resources, such
as cables and devices.
Both eDocs and eWorkforce were actively involved in the
elicitation of the requirements for the Amusa access control
middleware and assisted in its validation. For the interested
reader, the detailed description of these two case studies is
available in two technical reports [9, 10].
2.2 Problem illustration
Access control is the main application-level security mech-
anism of the applications of eDocs and eWorkforce. Such
access control should provide three main functionalities:
1. In the first place, such access control should enable the
provider to constrain its tenants, e.g., make sure that
only paying tenants can access the application.
2. Moreover, most SaaS applications require that the ten-
ants cannot access each other’s resources in the shared
application (a form of tenant isolation [13]).
3. And finally, both eDocs and eWorkforce have large
companies as customers and these companies have strin-
gent security requirements themselves. As a result, the
tenants should be able to constrain their own users of
the SaaS application.
While this functionality by itself is not trivial, it is made
even more challenging by the fact that each party wants to
apply its own access rules based on its own specific concepts:
1. In terms of provider rules, the access rules differ be-
tween eDocs and eWorkforce: eDocs requires the credit
of a tenant to be sufficient to access the application,
while eWorkforce charges tenants afterwards.
2. In terms of tenant isolation, both eDocs and eWork-
force require that tenants are separated by default, but
also require application-specific and tenant-specific ex-
ceptions to this tenant isolation. For example, eWork-
force requires that subcontractors are able to access
the tasks assigned to their respective subcontractors,
eDocs requires that resellers of the service are able to
access the documents of their own customers and some
tenants of eDocs require that their business partners
can access documents of shared projects.
3. In terms of tenant rules, the access rules differ be-
tween tenants. For example, for eDocs, a large bank
only permits its users to read documents belonging to
their assigned customers and a press agency only per-
mits members of the European region to access the
application. For eWorkforce, the tenants constrain
their employees based on their skills, interim contracts,
projects and internal departments. This variability
challenge is related to the known problem of tenant
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variability in SaaS [5, 13, 23], but is enlarged because
the access rules of a tenant depend heavily on its orga-
nizational structure and therefore inherently vary from
tenant to tenant.
As a result of this complexity, both eDocs and eWorkforce
and in extension other SaaS providers are all faced with the
challenge of setting up a complex access control infrastruc-
ture.
2.3 Resulting requirements
The goal of this work is to facilitate building and manag-
ing multi-tenant SaaS applications by addressing the chal-
lenges illustrated in the previous section. More precisely, the
goal of this work is to provide middleware for multi-tenant
access control management. This middleware should pro-
vide efficient access control management to the providers of
SaaS applications and their tenants, and should be reusable
by multiple SaaS providers. As such, the requirements for
this middleware are five-fold:
1. the middleware should enable the provider to easily
constrain the tenants in terms of application-specific
concepts,
2. the middleware should enable each tenant to easily
constrain its users in terms of its tenant-specific con-
cepts,
3. the middleware should combine the policies of all in-
volved organizations securely,
4. the middleware should enforce the access rules appro-
priate for each request in the shared application and,
5. the middleware should introduce low performance over-
head for the SaaS application.
3. AMUSA: SECURE THREE-LAYERED
ACCESS CONTROL MANAGEMENT
To address the requirements stated in the previous sec-
tion, this paper presents the Amusa middleware. Amusa
enables both the provider and all its tenants to express their
access rules on the SaaS application, combines these rules se-
curely and enforces them at run-time. To allow all parties
to express their rules in terms of their own concepts, Amusa
leverages the expressive model of attribute-based access con-
trol. Moreover, in order to simplify the overall access con-
trol management of all parties involved, Amusa employs an
incremental three-layered approach in which the provider
builds on the attributes and policies defined by Amusa, and
the tenants build on the attributes and policies defined by
the provider. In this section, we describe the enabling tech-
nologies leveraged by Amusa, its three-layered access control
management, how Amusa securely combines all policies and
its supporting middleware architecture.
Key scenario. For the rest of this paper, we focus on
an illustrative scenario of the eDocs case study employing
two tenants: Large Bank and Press Agency. In this scenario,
eDocs requires the credit of a tenant to be sufficient to ac-
cess the application and relaxes the default tenant isolation
policy to permit resellers of the eDocs application to view
the documents of their respective tenants. Large Bank only
permits its users to read documents belonging to their as-
signed customers and Press Agency only permits members
of the European region to access the application. Moreover,
Large Bank relaxes the tenant isolation policy to permit its
business partners to access the documents of shared projects.
3.1 Enabling technologies
To achieve the requirements of the previous section, Amusa
builds on three state-of-the-art access control technologies
that support part of these requirements, i.e. policy-based
access control, attribute-based access control and tree-struc-
tured policies.
Policy-based access control. Policy-based access con-
trol is an approach in which the access control rules are
separated from the mechanisms that enforce them. As such,
they can be externalized from the application that they con-
strain and be expressed in modular, declarative access con-
trol policies [21]. Amusa employs policy-based access control
to enable the tenant and provider to specify their own rules
without having to change the application.
Attribute-based access control. Attribute-Based Ac-
cess Control (ABAC [14]) is a recent model to express access
rules in terms of key-value properties of the subject, the re-
source, the action and the environment. These properties
are called attributes and include for example the subject
identifier, subject roles, resource type and the time. Amusa
employs ABAC because attributes provide a simple abstrac-
tion that enables users to be managed in terms of their prop-
erties. Moreover, ABAC provides an expressive policy model
that is able to express most of the rules of our case studies
such as permissions, roles, ownership, time, separation of
duty and location. However, ABAC by itself does not pro-
vide efficient access control management, e.g., each attribute
for each subject or resource still has to be defined by the ap-
propriate party.
Tree-structured policies. Tree-structured policies or
policy trees are a means to structure multiple rules into one
well-defined policy and reason about possible conflicts be-
tween these rules (e.g., [7, 17]). To achieve this, every ele-
ment in the tree defines to which requests it applies by means
of a target. The rules are the leaves of the tree and decisions
of children are combined using combination algorithms such
as FirstApplicable and PermitOverrides. Amusa employs
policy trees to combine the policies of the tenants and the
provider while guaranteeing important security properties,
e.g., making sure that tenants cannot override the provider
policies.
As a result, Amusa is an access control middleware that
builds on these technologies, but adds a SaaS-specific layer
that enables flexible and secure multi-tenancy. We discuss
the three-layered access control management of Amusa in
the next section.
3.2 Three-layered access control management
In terms of attribute-based access control, access control
management consists of managing attributes and managing
policies that employ these attributes. Amusa divides this
management over the three kinds of stakeholders involved:
the provider, the tenants and the Amusa middleware itself.
Firstly, Amusa predefines common attributes and policies
that can be reused across applications, providers and ten-
ants. Secondly, the provider offers the SaaS application.
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Figure 2: Amusa enables attributes to be incrementally
defined in three layers: Amusa, the provider and the
tenants (illustrated for the key scenario).
Therefore he knows the application domain and manages the
application resources and actions that should be protected.
This results in application-specific attributes and policies.
The provider also offers the service to tenants and there-
fore also manages the policies to constrain them. Thirdly,
the tenants manage their own users based on organization-
specific attributes and policies. Each of the latter parties
builds on the previous layer. This gradual extension favors
reusability and simplifies the overall management effort. In
the rest of this section, we describe the three-layered at-
tribute management and policy management in more detail.
3.2.1 Three-layered attribute management
Managing attributes entails two kinds of actions: (1) defin-
ing possible attributes for subjects and resources and (2) as-
signing values to the attributes. In this case, the three-
layered management applies to attribute definition: Amusa
itself pre-defines a fixed set of attributes, which the provider
can extend for its own application and which the tenants
in turn can extend for their organization. More precisely,
Amusa pre-defines the attributes it requires for its correct
functioning and a number of frequently occurring attributes.
The former includes the subject and resource identifiers and
the associated tenant of a subject or resource, the latter in-
cludes the owner of a resource and the roles of a subject. The
provider then defines the attributes of the resources in its
application and optionally some frequently-used application-
specific subject attributes that can be used by all tenants.
For example, in eDocs, each document has a sender and a
destination, each user has an e-mail address and each ten-
ant has a credit. Finally, the tenants define their tenant-
specific subject attributes. For example, Large Bank defines
attributes for departments, teams and projects, and Press
Agency also for geographic regions. The resulting attribute
definitions for the key scenario are illustrated in Figure 2.
After defining the appropriate attributes, each stakeholder
is responsible for assigning them to the resources and sub-
jects it controls. Amusa automatically assigns attributes
where possible, e.g., the identifier and tenant of every new
subject it creates. The provider (or more specifically, the
SaaS application) then assigns the appropriate attributes to
its resources. In essence, these attributes are already present
in the SaaS application itself. Finally, the tenant assigns the
subject attributes defined by Amusa, the provider or itself
to its subjects.
3.2.2 Three-layered policy management
The same three-layered model described above also ap-
plies to policy management. The policies of each layer can
be specified in terms of attributes that are available in that
Figure 3: Next to attributes, Amusa also enables poli-
cies to be incrementally defined in three layers: Amusa,
the provider and the tenants (illustrated for the key sce-
nario).
layer. Firstly, Amusa itself has some policies built-in that
apply to the provider and all tenants. The most important
of these is the default tenant isolation policy. These policies
can only reason about the attributes pre-defined by Amusa.
Secondly, the provider can specify policies about the tenants
as a whole. These policies can employ the attributes speci-
fied by Amusa and the provider itself. For example, eDocs
specifies that users belonging to a certain tenant cannot send
any document if the credit of that tenant is not sufficient.
Thirdly, the tenants can specify policies that apply to their
own users. These policies can employ the attributes specified
by Amusa, the provider and the tenant itself. For example,
Press Agency only permits subjects of the European region
to access the application. In addition to these policies, the
provider and the tenants can also specify selective exceptions
to tenant isolation. For example, this enables eDocs to per-
mit resellers to access the documents of their customers and
Large Bank to permit its business partners to access doc-
uments of shared projects. The resulting policy definitions
for the key scenario are illustrated in Figure 3. The policies
for constraining tenants and users are combined using logi-
cal “and” so that the provider and tenants can incrementally
restrict access. The isolation exceptions on the other hand
are combined using logical “or” so that the provider and the
tenants can incrementally expand access.
3.3 Securely combining the policies
Amusa is responsible for combining the policies of all stake-
holders in such a way that they are enforced correctly. This
means that even though all stakeholders can customize
Amusa by defining their own policies, Amusa must still guar-
antee certain security properties. Most importantly, tenants
should not be able to leverage there own policies to override
tenant isolation or the rules of the provider.
In order to achieve these properties, Amusa combines the
rules of all parties using the policy tree shown in Figure 4.
The leafs of this tree represent rules that return Permit or
Deny on a certain condition. The intermediate nodes com-
bine the effects of their children using a combination al-
gorithm and specify to which requests they apply using a
target. When the provider or a tenant adds or modifies a
policy, Amusa constructs this policy tree as follows:
1. Build the sub-tree for tenant isolation:
- Create a policy with target “any” and combination
algorithm PermitOverrides.
- Add the default rule for strict tenant isolation.
- Add the provider exceptions to tenant isolation.
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Figure 4: The policy tree that securely combines the policies of all stakeholders, illustrated for the key scenario.
- For each tenant, add its isolation exceptions wrapped
in a policy with target “res.owner == <tenant id>”.
2. Build the complete policy-tree:
- Create a policy with target “any” and combination
algorithm DenyOverrides.
- Add the sub-tree for tenant isolation.
- Add the provider policies about tenants.
- For each tenant, add its policies about its own users,
wrapped in a policy with target“subj.tenant == <ten-
ant id>” and the combination algorithm chosen by the
tenant.
This policy tree ensures that the overall access control de-
cision is correct because of the employed policy combina-
tion algorithms. Firstly, the sub-tree for tenant isolation,
the policies of the provider about tenants and the policies of
each tenant about their users are combined using DenyOver-
rides. As such, a request is only permitted if both tenant
isolation, the provider and the tenant permit it. On the
other hand, the default tenant isolation rules and the ex-
ceptions of the provider and the tenants are combined using
PermitOverrides. As such, a request is permitted if one ex-
ception permits it (and if the other top-level policies permit
it). Additionally, the policies of each tenant are inserted in
the tree below a target that only applies to the subjects or
resources of that tenant and cannot be modified by the ten-
ants. As such, only the policies of the appropriate tenant
apply to the employees of that tenant. The security eval-
uation of Section 4.1 validates and illustrates the security
properties that follow from this policy tree.
Notice that every element in the policy tree of Figure 4
is defined by exactly one stakeholder. This illustrates that
three-layered access control management can effectively seg-
regate the different stakeholders.
3.4 Supporting middleware architecture
Following the management architecture described in the
previous sections, this section describes the architecture of
the Amusa middleware that supports this management. Fig-
ure 5 shows this architecture. From the point of view of
Amusa, the application consists of two components: the ap-
plication logic and the database containing the application
resources. The Amusa middleware itself consists of six major
components: the policy decision point, the authentication
Figure 5: Architecture of the Amusa middleware. The
policy decision point is the component that evaluates
the policies and returns an access decision. AuthN is
authentication.
endpoint, the provider administrator dashboard, the tenant
administrator dashboard, the database containing attribute
definitions and the database containing subject attributes.
Of these components, the policy decision point evaluates the
access control policies and returns access decisions to the
application. The dashboards are used by the provider and
tenant administrators to define and assign attributes, and
deploy policies. Whenever an administrator makes a change
to its policies, the dashboards construct the complete policy
tree and deploy it to the policy decision point.
The authentication and authorization flows resulting from
this architecture are as follows. In order to authenticate a
user, the application redirects the user to the authentica-
tion front-end provided by Amusa using a federated authen-
tication technique such as SAML [1]. After successful au-
thentication, the authentication endpoint redirects the user
back to the application with an authentication statement
and his or her subject attributes. In order to then authorize
a request of the user, the application sends an authoriza-
tion request consisting of attributes to the policy decision
point. The policy decision point then evaluates the policy
tree of Figure 4. When the policy decision point requires
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an attribute during policy evaluation, it first checks the at-
tributes sent by the application and then searches for it in
the appropriate database if needed. In the end, the policy
decision point returns an access decision to the application,
which enforces this decision.
Note that in essence, the policy decision point evaluates
the complete policy containing all policies of all stakehold-
ers for every request. However, because of the structure of
the complete policy tree (see Figure 4), only the appropri-
ate policies apply and are effectively evaluated. As such,
this set-up effectively binds the correct policies at run-time,
which was one of the explicit requirements for supporting
multi-tenant access control.
4. EVALUATION
The previous section presented the concept of three-layered
access control management for SaaS applications and the
supporting Amusa middleware. Section 3.2 already illus-
trated that this three-layered approach can effectively segre-
gate the different roles in SaaS access control management.
This section further evaluates the security properties and
performance impact of Amusa.
4.1 Security
Section 3.3 described the policy tree employed by Amusa
to securely combine the policies of all the involved parties. In
this section, we validate that this policy tree indeed keeps
the complete policy secure. First we deduct a number of
security properties guaranteed by the policy tree, then we
illustrate how these properties mitigate certain misuse cases.
Security properties. In essence, the policy tree guar-
antees the following security properties:
1. If the provider denies a request, a tenant can never
override this. The policy tree achieves this by combining
the policies of all stakeholders using the DenyOverrides com-
bination algorithm. As a result, a Deny of the provider
policies can never by overridden by a tenant policy.
2. Tenants can only specify policies about their own users.
The policy tree achieves this by inserting the policies of a
certain tenant below a target that only applies to its own
subjects.
3. Only the policies of the appropriate tenant are taken
into account for a certain request. The policy tree achieves
this as a result of the previous guarantee, combined with the
guarantees of Amusa that all tenant identifiers are unique,
that the tenant is correctly assigned to subjects and that
the assigned tenant cannot be changed by any subject.
4. Tenants and provider can override the default tenant
isolation policy. The policy tree achieves this by combining
the default tenant isolation policy with the isolation excep-
tions of the provider and the tenants using PermitOverrides.
As such, the provider and its tenants can all override a Deny
of the default isolation policy.
5. Tenants can override tenant isolation only to permit
others to view its application resources. The policy tree
achieves this by inserting the isolation exceptions of a certain
tenant below a target that only applies to its own resources.
6. Tenants cannot gain access to the resources of other
tenants using their own policies. The policy tree achieves
this as a result of the previous security guarantees. More
precisely, if a user of a tenant A tries to access a resource
belonging to tenant B, the constraining policies of tenant A
and the isolation exceptions of tenant B apply, respectively
because of the subject and the resource of the request. How-
ever, unless the isolation exceptions of tenant B permit the
request, the Deny of the default isolation policy will always
overrule a possible Permit of tenant A.
Note that some of these guarantees also depend on the cor-
rectness of certain attributes. For example, it should not be
possible for a user to change the attribute subj.tenant credit.
To guarantee this to the provider, the supporting middle-
ware can enforce that certain attributes cannot be defined
or assigned by tenants.
Illustration. To show that these properties keep the
complete policy secure, take the following three examples:
Example 1. Assume that Large Bank tries to gain access
to the resources of Press Agency by configuring the follow-
ing rule R1: Permit if subj.tenant == “Large Bank” and
res.owner == “Press Agency”. This is handled by Guaran-
tee 6, keeping the resources of Press Agency secure.
Example 2. Imagine that Large Bank tries to perform
more actions than its credit permits by configuring the fol-
lowing rule R2: Permit if subj.tenant credit == 0. This is
handled by Guarantee 1, which gives preference to the Deny
of the provider policies.
Example 3. Imagine that Large Bank tries to deny the
use of the application to Press Agency by configuring the
following rule R3: Deny if subj.tenant == “Press Agency”.
This is handled by Guarantee 2, i.e. R3 will never apply to
the users of Press Agency.
4.2 Performance
Next to the security properties of Amusa, we also evalu-
ate its performance overhead on a request of a user to the
application. More precisely, we evaluated the overall perfor-
mance overhead of Amusa and the behavior of Amusa with
regard to a growing number of tenants.
Set-up. To evaluate the performance overhead of Amusa,
we developed a prototype of both the Amusa middleware
as well as the eDocs application running on top of this
middleware. Both prototypes are written in Java and em-
ploy the Spring 3 Web MVC framework for the front-ends.
The Amusa prototype employs SAML [1] for authentication,
XACML2 [20] for policy specification and an extended ver-
sion of the SunXACML engine for policy evaluation. The ap-
plication prototype allows users to send documents to each
other, as well as reading and managing these documents.
The tests deploy the architecture of Figure 5 on three
nodes, respectively hosting (1) the application logic and
database, (2) the Amusa attribute database, and (3) the
client making the requests to the application. The policy
decision point is compiled into the application. Each test
was repeated until the confidence interval of the average
policy evaluation time was situated within 2% of the sam-
pled mean for a confidence level of 95%. We excluded the
top 1% of the results because a small fraction of these were
up to 100 times larger than the mean, presumably because
of running the tests on a shared cloud platform.
The tests employ the policies of the eDocs SaaS applica-
tion and its Large Bank tenant. Measuring the performance
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Figure 6: The total policy evaluation time from the
point of view of the application for 8 representative re-
quests that cover the whole policy, showing the time
spent on fetching attributes and on processing the policy.
The percentage on top of each bar represents the fraction
of the complete time to process the application request
spent on policy evaluation. The dotted line represents
the average over all requests. Lower is better.
overhead of access control is not trivial because this over-
head largely depends on the size and structure of the in-
volved policy. In this regard, we opted for measuring the
performance of a set of realistic policies instead of a set of
artificial policies. The employed policy contains 32 rules,
has a tree depth of 4, requires 26 different attributes and
comprises 1119 lines of XACML in total. Because reach-
ing an access decision often does not require to evaluate the
complete policy, we report the results for 8 representative
authorization requests that cover the complete policy. More
precisely, these requests trigger the tenant isolation policy,
the provider policies and the different rules of Large Bank.
A demo of Amusa, the code of both prototypes and the
employed policies are available on-line1.
Overall performance overhead. To measure the per-
formance overhead of Amusa, we measured the time it takes
to evaluate the policy for every request. Figure 6 sum-
marizes these results. As shown, the overall performance
overhead of Amusa is low with an average of 2.8ms for all
requests. In a broader perspective, this is 4.9% of the server-
side application request time and 1.5% of the total client-side
request time. Figure 6 also shows that the policy evaluation
time varies from request to request and is largely determined
by the time spent on fetching attributes. An attribute fetch
requires 1.2ms on average and the total time for fetching at-
tributes is determined by the number of attributes required
for reaching a decision. R6 requires the most attributes (i.e.,
7) and as a result requires the longest evaluation time.
Growing number of tenants. With regard to a grow-
ing number of tenants, the only aspect of Amusa that grows
with the number of tenants is the size of the complete policy
tree. More precisely, each new tenant adds a branch to the
policy tree of which the applicability will be checked during
each policy evaluation. eDocs and eWorkforce both have
around 50 tenants. For this size, testing the applicability of
all tenant policies imposes a mean performance overhead of
less than 0.15ms. This overhead is negligible as compared
to the overall performance overhead, but grows linearly with
1https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/amusa/
the number of tenants. As such, it can become beneficial for
larger SaaS applications to introduce a specialized policy
primitive for more efficient matching of the tenant policies,
e.g., a hash-map based on the tenant identifier.
Summary. These tests can be considered worst-case gi-
ven that the operations of our application were limited in
complexity with respect to practical applications. Even in
this context, our performance results can be considered low.
Moreover, the overhead of Amusa can still be lowered us-
ing other performance tactics, e.g., high-performant policy
engines such as [18], which was not the focus of this work.
5. RELATEDWORK
The Amusa middleware builds on a large body of work
from the domains of multi-tenancy, access control and policy-
based middleware. Firstly, while SaaS is a relatively young
paradigm, it has been subject of research for quite some
time. For example, in 2007, Guo et al. [13] identified two
high-level requirements: isolating tenants and allowing the
SaaS application to be customized to the specific needs of
each tenant. The latter is also identified by Bezemer et
al. [5] and Sun et al. [23]. This work focuses on access con-
trol, which is both a means to provide (application-specific)
tenant isolation and an important source of variability in
SaaS. However, to the best of our knowledge, very little
work has been performed to achieve these requirements. In
the state of practice, the authors are not aware of solutions
that provide expressive tenant-specific policy-based access
control, while our industrial partners stressed the need for
such technology. Tenant isolation is mostly implemented
manually, and builds on strict data isolation in the data
store. More specifically, a built-in tenant identifier is used
in database queries. This approach is adopted for example
in GAE [2]. However, this does not allow easy application-
specific customization of the isolation policy. In the state
of the art, Calero et al. [3] also focused on multi-tenant au-
thorization for cloud applications. They opted for extend-
ing role-based access control (RBAC, [12]) specifically for
multi-tenancy. This work has later been formalized by Tang
et al. [24]. Amusa extends this approach by moving from
RBAC to more expressive attribute-based policy trees and
extending the architecture into a reusable middleware.
Secondly, Amusa was inspired by other access control sys-
tems described in literature. Multiple such systems have
been described in the domain of grid computing, e.g., CAS,
Cardea and PRIMA [6]. Access control in this domain fo-
cuses on scalable access control management for a possibly
large number of possibly large virtual organizations. There-
fore, these systems employ techniques similar to the ones
used by Amusa, such as the decoupling of enforcement and
policy evaluation. A good overview of this domain is given
in [6]. Amusa combines these techniques with the recent
technologies of ABAC and policy trees into a configurable
access control middleware for the domain of SaaS. More re-
cently, Fatema et al. [11] and Lazouski et al. [16] also de-
scribed access control systems relevant to Amusa. Both com-
plement Amusa because they employ similar building blocks,
but have a different focus, respectively privacy in multi-
organizational systems and usage control in Infrastructure
as a Service. Therefore, it would be interesting to see how
these systems can be combined with Amusa.
Thirdly, Amusa builds on the experience with policies in
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the domain of middleware. For example, early work by Slo-
man [22] already applied policies for declaratively manag-
ing access control in distributed systems, which later lead
to the definition of the influential Ponder specification lan-
guage for access control policies [8]. Next to access con-
trol, policies have been applied for a large variety of goals
in the domain of middleware. Amongst others, Bacon et
al. [4] employ policies for information flow control in multi-
domain applications, Wun and Jacobson [25] for managing
content-based publish/subscribe middleware and Kumar et
al. [15] for describing self-management behavior. The com-
mon denominator of all this work is that policies are used
to separate semantics from enforcement and describe the se-
mantics declaratively. Amusa applied this principle to the
domain of SaaS access control.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented Amusa, an access control mid-
dleware for multi-tenant Software-as-a-Service applications.
This research was conducted in close collaboration with two
industry partners, an approach that resulted in a set of key
requirements for access control in SaaS. Amusa offers a man-
agement and enforcement architecture that supports these
requirements. Both the provider and the tenants can effec-
tively specify their access rules in terms of their own con-
cepts using three-layered access control management based
on attribute-based tree-structured policies. Amusa com-
bines the rules of all parties securely and enforces them at
run-time. Moreover, the evaluation showed that Amusa also
introduces low performance overhead.
The main contribution of Amusa is the SaaS-specific layer
for flexible and secure multi-tenancy on top of attribute-
based tree-structured access control policies. This work ap-
plied these techniques in a three-layered approach, which
simplifies access control management through gradual re-
finement. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
most extensive study and application of these technologies
described in literature and our experience leads us to believe
that all three technologies are important enablers for future
access control research.
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